Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law
Volume 9
Issue 1 Issue 1 - Fall 2006

Article 4

2006

Creative Industries in Developing Countries and Intellectual
Property Protection
Lauren Loew

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and
the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lauren Loew, Creative Industries in Developing Countries and Intellectual Property Protection, 9 Vanderbilt
Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 171 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw/vol9/iss1/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law by an authorized editor of
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Creative Industries in Developing
Countries and Intellectual Property
Protection
I.

II.

III.

B ACKGROU ND ..............................................................................
A. A Brief Summary of the Evolution of InternationalIP
L a w .......................................................................................
B. InternationalIP Law from the Perspective of Developing
N a tions .................................................................................
C. The Disagreement over InternationalIP Laws and
Developing Countries...........................................................
1. Intellectual Property Protection Benefits Developing
C oun tries ........................................................................
2. Intellectual Property Protection Does Not Address
the Needs of Developing Countries ...............................
ANALY SIS .....................................................................................
A. One Size Does Not Fit All for IP Laws ................................
1. The Costs and Benefits of Stronger IP Laws ................
2. The Prerequisite Institutional Capacity for
Strengthening IP Laws ..................................................
B. TRIPS Obsoletes Many PriorSuccess Stories Utilizing
Non-Western Style IP Laws .................................................
C. The Solution: Tailored Systems and Tangible Benefits
for Developing Countries who Strengthen IP Laws ...........
C ON CLU SION ...............................................................................

173
17 4
177
179
180
183
185
185
185
192
193
197
199

International intellectual property law (hereafter referred to as
IP law) has an increasingly important significance for international
trade and relations. From the music industry to the drug industry,
intellectual property is a lucrative market, and both individuals and
corporations have a lot to lose from the infringement of intellectual
property rights. For example, music is a $40 billion worldwide
industry.1
According to the Recording Industry Association of
American (RIAA), the music industry loses approximately $4.2 billion

1.
Recording Industry Association of America, Press Room, Marketing Data,
http://www.riaa.com/news/marketingdata/default.asp
(last visited Oct. 27, 2006)
[hereinafter RJAA, Marketing Data].
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each year to worldwide piracy. 2 Although these facts bring to light the
economic losses of industries and individuals from IP infringement,
the global community is far from reaching a consensus on how to
address these issues.
As explained by the Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights, the schism in international IP law scholarship begins with the
basic characterization of IP rights. 3 "Some see IP rights principally as
economic or commercial rights, and others as akin to political or
human rights."4 Still others view IP rights as a creation of Western
societies that are not applicable, or not appropriate, for developing
countries.5 Various international agreements, such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Berne Convention, reflect these
distinct characterizations, but the most recent and dominant treaty,
the Trade Related Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPS)
agreement, treats IP rights as economic rights. 6 Due to the ubiquity of
the TRIPS agreement in international IP law, this note largely
analyzes the various perspectives through the lenses of economics and
case studies.
Since the implementation of the TRIPS agreement, the debate
has turned towards what options are economically viable for
developing countries. One side of the debate suggests that IP laws
should be implemented as they currently stand, with the same laws
7
and levels of protection in both developed and developing countries.
Another perspective suggests that developing countries should be able

2.
Recording
Industry Association
of America,
Issues,
http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2006).

Anti-Piracy,

3.
See COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 6 (2002) (U.K.), available at

http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final reportlCIPRfullfmal.pdf.
4.
Id.
5.
See Dru Brenner-Beck, Do As I Say, Not As I Did, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 84,
101 (1992); Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge & Intellectual Property: A TRIPSCompatible Approach, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 137, 138-44.
6.
COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 6.
7.
See Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, arts. 65, 66,
33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/27-trips.pdf
[hereinafter TRIPS] (obliging member signatories of the agreement to provide a certain
level of protection, allowing delay for compliance based on the level of development, but not
allowing lower levels of intellectual property protection post-implementation based on a
country's level of development); COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra
note 3 at 12-13 (listing the typical intellectual property rights given to creators); Jean
Raymond Homere, Intellectual Property Rights Can Help Stimulate the Economic
Development of Least Developed Countries, 27 Colum. J. L. & Arts 277, 282 (2004) (noting
TRIPS "harmonize[s]" laws "by outlining the minimum standards that each nation must
provide in its national law for each form of intellectual property").
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to use piracy to obtain a broader knowledge base and domestic
capacity before implementing IP laws currently in place in Western
societies. 8 Some scholars also suggest that IP laws should incorporate

non-Western ideals, such as benefit-sharing. 9
In Senegal, Lebanon, and other developing countries, toying
with these various perspectives is a dangerous game. The potential
costs and consequences of "getting the IP system 'wrong' in a
developing country" may be far higher, and the impact much greater,
than in the rest of the world. 10 Currently, Senegal is working to
develop a music industry to diversify its economic base and strengthen
the cultural solidarity of the country, looking to Nashville for
inspiration."
Lebanon has an entertainment industry poised to
explode onto the international scene, fed by a "large pool of creative
talent."'12 In these two examples, the future of each country's economy
may rest with those who are shaping the IP laws, and a failed IP
regime could take the wind out of the sails of these growing industries.
This note explains the history and current status of this schism
in international IP law, focusing specifically on the efforts of the
Africa Music Project and several other case studies involving creative
industries. Part I of this note briefly discusses the history leading up
to the current split in IP law scholarship, including the birth and
evolution of intellectual property laws. Part II analyzes the two main
arguments and proposes a solution to the current IP law regime that
acknowledges the realities of modern globalization while respecting
the economic disadvantage of developing countries.
I. BACKGROUND

Although music and other creative endeavors "touch[ ] every
person of every culture on the globe,"'13 there are differences between
the role of international IP law in developed and developing countries.

8.
See Brenner-Beck, supra note 5, at 84.
9.
See Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property:
Narratives of Developing Country Participationin the Global Intellectual Property System,
7 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 315, 355-57 (2003).
10.
COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 4.
11.
Frank J. Penna et al., The Africa Music Project, in POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE:
PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 95, 97 (J. Michael
Finger & Philip Schuler eds., 2004), available at http://www.netlibrary.com.
12.
Keith E. Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in Lebanon, in
INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

AND

DEVELOPMENT:

LESSONS

FROM

RECENT

ECONOMIC

RESEARCH 259, 263 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/research/IntellProp-temp.pdf.
13.
RIAA, MarketingData, supra note 1.
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In order to understand the current situation, this section explores 1)
the evolution of international IP law, 2) international IP law from the
perspective of developing nations, and 3) the current debate about the
role of international IP law in developing countries.
A. A Brief Summary of the Evolution of InternationalIP Law
International IP law began emerging as an important tool for
trade between Africans and Europeans long before the intellectual
property developments of the nineteenth century. Pre-colonial trade
"involved Africans and Europeans in complex relationships that
required them to hammer out systems of accountability and processes
of dispute." 14 In the beginning of colonialism, European states were
involved in fierce competition for "spheres of influence," and towards
the end of the nineteenth century, "European powers penetrated the
African interior."'15 European ideals of IP law became a part of their
African colonies as well, setting the stage for international IP law.
On March 20, 1883, during both the Industrial Revolution and
the peak of European influence over Africa, 16 the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property was created (hereinafter the
Paris Convention). 17 The object of the document was to protect
"patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service
marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations of origin,
and the repression of unfair competition."' 8 The contracting parties
were primarily European countries. 19
Shortly after the Paris
Convention, on September 9, 1886, the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 20 (hereinafter the Berne
Convention) was held. The mission of the Berne Convention was to

14.

Richard Roberts & Kristin Mann, Law in Colonial Africa, in LAW IN COLONIAL

AFRICA 3, 9 (Kristin Mann & Richard Roberts, eds., 1991).

15.
Id. at 14-15.
16.
Id. at 3, 9, 14 (noting that "[i]ndustrialization had widened the'material and
technological gap between" Africa and Europe, and stating that at the end of the
nineteenth century, European power was more widespread in Africa,
"profoundly"
affecting the legal order in Africa).
17.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
available at www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocswo020.html.
18.
Id. art. 1(2).
19.
See World Intellectual Property Organization, Treaties Database, Contracting
Parties, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty-id=2 (last visited
Oct. 28, 2006) (listing parties to the Paris Convention and the date the treaty entered into
force in each party nation).
20.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 99-27 (1971), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/
berne/trtdocswo001.html [hereinafter Berne Convention].

2006]

CREATIVE INDUSTRIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

175

21
protect "the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works."
22
Again, the contracting parties were primarily European countries.
With the end of colonialism in the nineteenth century, the
international intellectual property system entered uncharted
territory. The former colonies became sovereign states and therefore
came face to face with the challenges of integration into the
international framework. 23 These developing countries also came from
backgrounds that were significantly different from the European
nations that created the treaties. 2 4 To ease their transition, the
international community softened the obligations of developing
countries within the international framework, including their
25
obligations under international IP law.
Changes made to the Berne Convention reflected the
importance of addressing developing countries' needs within
international IP laws.
The Berne Convention was modified in
Stockholm in 1967, but the changes were soon seen as too
controversial; many developed countries failed to ratify these changes,
and the Berne Convention was again revised in 1971.26 The Paris
Revisions of 1971 yielded the incorporation of an appendix describing
the "Special Provisions Regarding Developing Countries" into the
Berne Convention.2 7 The provisions applied to:
[A]ny country regarded as a developing country in conformity with the established
practice of the General Assembly of the United Nations which ratifies or accedes to
this Act, . . . and which, having regard to its economic situation and its social or
cultural needs, does not consider itself immediately in a position to make provision
for the protection of all the rights as provided for in this Act ....28

21.
Id. art I.
22.
The contracting parties from 1886-1900 were Belgium. France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, and the United
Kingdom. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Contracting Parties, Berne
Convention, 1886-1900, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country_id=ALL&
start-year=1886&end-year=1900&search what=C&treatyid=15 (last visited Nov. 8,
2006).
23.
Okediji, supra note 9, at 326.
24.
Id.
25.
Id. at 327. For example, developing countries are allowed "more favourable
treatment" under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), including
allowance of reduced tariffs in favor of developing countries. Decision on Differential and
More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participationof Developing Countries,
L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.).
26.
Okediji, supra note 9, at 327; see also Irwin A. Olian, Jr., International
Copyright and the Needs of Developing Countries: The Awakening at Stockholm and Paris,
7 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 81, 103 (1974).
27.
See Berne Convention, supra note 20, app.
28.
Id. app., art. 1 (1).
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The appendix from the Paris Revisions, however, was "generally
acknowledged as a failure in terms of its utility to and by developing
29
countries."
In the mid-twentieth century, international IP law was the
focus of yet another international convention.
The Universal
Copyright Convention, completed on September 6, 1952, was created
to "ensure respect for the rights of the individual and encourage the
development of literature, the sciences and the arts."30
The
underlying rationale in the Universal Copyright Convention differed
from the Berne Convention in that copyright was treated as a "license
granted by the state in order to stimulate artistic creation," whereas
the Berne Convention treated copyright as the "inherent or natural
right of the author. '31
The Universal Copyright Convention
established the obligation of contracting parties "to provide for the
'adequate and effective protection of the rights of authors and other
copyright proprietors in literary, scientific, and artistic works"' but did
not describe the protection itself in detail. 32
The major international agreement affecting developing
countries today has radically changed the face of IP law. The Trade
Related Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement
was signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on April 15, 1994 and incorporated
into the agreement creating the WTO. 33 The TRIPS agreement
"ma[d]e compliance with intellectual property laws an economic
imperative" for developing countries and served to "upgrade, update
and reshape the laws of th[o]se countries."3 4 The TRIPS agreement
also incorporated large portions of the Berne Convention, 35 which in
turn pushed the Universal Copyright Convention outside of the
central international framework. 36 Although TRIPS now dominates
29.
Okediji, supra note 9, at 328. '"The Revisions adopted a complex Appendix,
much less radical than the Stockholm Protocol, designed to facilitate access by developing
countries to copyrighted works through a compulsory license system." Id.
30.
Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, pmbl., 6 U.S.T. 2731, available
at http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php.URLID=1814&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URL_
SECTION=201.html.
31.
Olian, supra note 26, at 85.
32.

Olian, supra note 26, at 85 (quoting UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION,

supra note 30, art. I).
33.
See TRIPS, supra note 7.
34.
Okediji, supra note 9, at 336-37.
35.
See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 7, Part II, art. 9.
36.
The Universal Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention had very
different views on intellectual property. See Olian, supra note 26, at 85 (noting, for
example, that the Berne Convention was more explicit in the level of protection required,
whereas the Universal Copyright Convention was vague in this regard). TRIPS adopted
the Berne Convention's general framework of specific, universal obligations, and therefore
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international IP law, there are still many unresolved issues, as
evidenced by the recent outcry over intellectual property rights in
regards to the AIDS crisis in developing countries, 37 as well as the
recent crackdown on piracy of music, software, and movies by the
38
entertainment industry.
B. InternationalIP Law from the Perspective of Developing Nations
International IP law has largely been created and promulgated
by developed countries.
When taken from the perspective of
developing nations, the formation, evolution, and current status of
international IP laws are extraordinarily different. J. Michael Finger,
the editor of Poor People's Knowledge: Promoting Intellectual Property
in Developing Countries, describes the prevailing attitude in
international IP law as found in the TRIPS agreement:
[The TRIPS] agreement . . . is about the knowledge that exists in developed
countries, about developing countries' access to that
knowledge, and particularly
39
about developing countries paying for that access.

Finger insists that the "knowledge that exists or might be created in
developing countries" has been largely overlooked by international IP
laws; when it has been addressed, it is to protect 'traditional
knowledge' against misappropriation by industrial country interests"
40
and police 'biopiracy' on the part of the industrial country interests."
Some scholars believe that international IP law surged during
the Enlightenment, when "[p]olitical and social attitudes in Europe
were consequently informed by a sense of superiority in all spheres,
and culminated in the desire to spread this enlightenment to nonEuropeans. '"41 The development of IP law is often considered part of
the power struggle between European countries "to secure national

the Universal Copyright Convention's views have not been adopted into the current
international intellectual property regime.
37.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, Drug Issue Casts a Shadow on Trade Talks, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2001, at Wl (discussing the disagreements about drug patent protection).
38.
See, e.g., David Scharfenberg, Defying a Music Industry Crackdown, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, at 14WC3 (describing the recent crackdown of the music industry on

pirated music).
39.
J. Michael Finger, Introduction and Overview, in POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE:
PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 11, at 1, 1.
40.
Id. (defining biopiracy as "the exploitation of the biodiversity that exists in
developing countries to develop agricultural products, healthcare products, and so forth,
without proper compensation to the 'traditional communities' that first discovered the
usefulness of such genetic material").
41.
Okediji, supra note 9, at 322.
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economic interests against other European countries in colonial
42
territories."
Starting with the decolonization of Africa and other colonies,
developing countries entered the international legal framework and
became involved with international IP laws. 43 When this occurred,
there was a brief scramble to ensure the continuity of IP laws in order
to protect foreign interests in those developing countries. 44 One
scholar writes:
Even at the decisive moment of independence [of former colonies in Africa],
intellectual property laws were not directed at the domestic innovation
environment, but were rather projected outwards to foreign nationals who would
benefit from protection. Developing countries, in essence, service the international
45
system and not vice-versa.

Many scholars view intellectual property rights as a "means for all the
European countries to control competition from former colonies as
global rights became an entrenched feature of international economic
relations." 46 To ensure this continuity and accession to international
treaties, developing countries were allowed a lower set of obligations
under international treaties. 47 This lower bar for compliance also
meant a lower level of power within the international intellectual
property framework, and many of the changes made in the twentieth
century reflected this trade off.
During the twentieth century, developing countries were able
to band together to make slight changes to international IP law, such
as forcing a "North-South stalemate" over strengthening some of the
Paris Convention's "conditions on compulsory licensing of patents." 48
However, the power of developing countries within the international
organizations was weaker than developed countries, and the relatively
ineffective Universal Copyright Convention and Paris Revision to the
Berne Convention demonstrate this imbalance of power. 49

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 325.
See id. at 326.
See id. at 331.
Id.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 328-29.
Paul Salmon, Cooperation Between the World Intellectual Property Organization

(WIPO) and the World Trade Organization(WTO), 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 429,

433 (2003). The "North-South" stalemate occurred when the developed countries ("North")
argued for strengthened conditions on compulsory licensing of patents, and the developing
countries ("South") all took the other side, and argued for a weakened Convention. Id. The
stalemate resulted in a draw and no changes were made to the Paris Convention. Id.
49.
See generally Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 30; Berne
Convention, supra note 20.
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Today, the TRIPS agreement and the ubiquitous bilateral
intellectual property treaties form the central framework of
international IP law. Negotiations for the TRIPS agreement were an
exhaustive process, and in the end both developed and developing
countries compromised. 50 Nonetheless, TRIPS radically changed the
face of international IP law.
The TRIPS agreement provided
"minimum standards for legal recognition of intellectual property
rights" that were basically the standard levels already in place in most
developed countries.5 1 In 1996, one scholar wrote:
Far from being limited to trade relations, correcting the international balance of
trade, or lowering customs trade barriers, TRIPS attempts to remake international
copyright law in the image of Western copyright law. If TRIPS is successful across
the breathtaking sweep of signatory countries, it will be "one of the most effective
vehicles of Western imperialism in history.52

C. The Disagreementover InternationalIP Laws and Developing
Countries
The evolution of international IP laws has caused a schism
within legal scholarship. On one side of the divide, scholars feel that
intellectual property protection is necessary for the advancement of
developing countries.5 3 Within this debate are those who argue that
interacting with developed countries will stimulate developing
countries and others who argue that innovation from within

50.
Okediji, supra note 9, at 338 (pointing to the large number of bilateral
agreements as evidence of this compromise).
51.
Finger, supra note 39, at 3.
52.
Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and
Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 614 (1996).
53.
See Finger, supra note 39, at 4 (summarizing a traditional argument for
increasing intellectual property protection). Finger states:
There would be benefits for developing countries from [increasing IP protection
in developing countries], the industrial negotiators contended. If developing
countries enforced [intellectual property rights] as the TRIPS Agreement
specifies, they would attract considerable foreign investment. Furthermore,
industrial country companies would have an incentive to create products aimed
at problems, such as tropical diseases, that were of particular concern to
developing countries.
Id. See also Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus, Why We Study Intellectual Property Rights
and What We Have Learned, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT, LESSONS
FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH, supra note 12, at 12-13 (although not advocating
either side of this debate, compiling economic research on the economic benefits of
increased IP protection from various studies, pointing out that "a reformed legal regime is
likely to be necessary but not sufficient condition for local technology development," and
concluding that although there are many costs and other factors to consider in increased
intellectual property protection, "there is an important development dimension to the
protection of [intellectual property rights]").
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developing countries will provide the stimulus. On the other side of
the debate, some scholars feel that current international IP laws do
not properly serve developing countries' needs. 54 Proponents of this
view offer many alternatives, including allowing an economic
threshold before IP laws apply to a country and incorporating
developing countries' and traditional communities' values into
intellectual property protection.
1. Intellectual Property Protection Benefits Developing Countries
Many of the arguments within the intellectual property debate
intertwine both patent protection and copyright protection. These two
types of intellectual property protection are combined in today's
international IP laws, and therefore the arguments provided by
scholars often apply to both. Dru Brenner-Beck summarizes the
arguments supporting intellectual property protection in developing
countries below (often deemed the" developed-countries' argument"):
[P]rotection of intellectual property is essential to the successful operation of a
system that promotes global innovation, and thus benefits all ....
[P]rotection of
intellectual property rights directly benefits [developing countries'] development
by: 1) promoting the transfer of technology from the developed nations to
[developing countries]; 2) encouraging direct foreign investment . . . in the

[developing countries]; 3) stimulating First World R[esearch] & D[evelopment] into
problems specific to [developing countries];
and 4) strengthening the incentive for
55
domestic innovation and creativity.

In support of the first argument that protection promotes "global
innovation," developed countries suggest that, due to the "economic
nature of intellectual property," providing protection for intellectual
property rights "add[s] the fuel of interest to the fire of genius." 56 This
assumes that additional intellectual property right protection
increases both creativity and technological innovation because the
economic gain is greater for the originator.
The second argument is that protection promotes developing
countries' development by sharing technology, encouraging foreign
direct investment (FDI), increasing research and development into
developing countries' problems, and stimulating domestic innovation
54.
See generally Brenner-Beck, supra note 5, at 97-100 (outlining the arguments of
developing countries that stronger intellectual property protection does not necessarily
benefit their development); Angela R. Riley, "Straight Stealing" Towards an Indigenous
System of Cultural Property Protection,80 WASH. L. REV. 69 (2005) (arguing that cultural
protection should be based in the indigenous groups themselves, not through a top-down
system).
55.
Brenner-Beck, supra note 5, at 91 (footnote cf omitted).
56.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting RESPECTFULLY QUOTED 288
(Suzy Platt ed., 1989) (quoting Abraham Lincoln)).
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and creativity.5 7 This is supported by a 1987 survey where seventyfive percent of participating companies saw "inadequate protection of
intellectual property rights as a strong disincentive to license
technology to developing countries." 5 8 Developed countries also often
state that stronger protection would encourage these companies to
invest in production facilities in the developing countries.5 9 The final
argument, indicating that protection stimulates domestic innovation
and creativity, is supported by the idea that a 'copy-cat' mentality...
destroy[s] [the developing countries'] ability to sustain domestic
innovation and escape their 'lesser developed' status."60
One
argument takes this a step further, pointing to "an intimate link
between respect for individual human rights and respect for a
copyright system that values and promotes individual human creative
61
achievement."
Another group of scholars has focused more intently on how
intellectual property protection benefits indigenous creativity in
developing countries. In particular, the World Bank instituted the
Africa Music Project as an "ongoing effort . . . to help Africans to
advance the business and cultural potential of their music." 62 The
underlying idea of the project is that "[t]he music industry has the
potential to be an important symbol as well as a substantive element
in bringing a poor society forward. ' 63 The focus is on Africa because of
the business potential, as well as the pervasiveness of music in
African life. 64 A member of Rafrache, a Senegalese band, explains:
"When you are born, there is music, when you die there is music, and
65
when you are happy there is music."
The Africa Music Project takes part of its influence from
Nashville, Tennessee, relying on the fact that Nashville transformed
from a relatively poor, indistinguishable city to the successful,
bustling seat of the U.S. country music industry.6 6 It envisions that,
like Tennessee, "African countries would create their own Nashvilles"

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 93.
Id. at 94.
See id.
Id. at 95.

61.
62.

Hamilton, supra note 52, at 618.
Penna, supra note 11, at 95.

63.
64.

Id.
Id.

65.
66.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 97.
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and produce their own music, keeping the jobs, success, and profits
67
within the African countries.
Along with a host of infrastructure problems, including
electricity, the traditional barter system, and free space to perform,
one of the main obstacles facing the success of this project is piracy.
Almost all African countries have a piracy level over twenty-five
68
percent, with some estimates reaching eighty-five to ninety percent.
One of the methods promulgated in both Senegal and Ghana to
combat piracy is the use of holograms on copyrighted music, combined
with a public relations campaign to encourage buying music with
holograms. 69 Although the Africa Music Project is ongoing, thus far
the "major success . . . has been to assist musicians in Senegal in
recognizing that they can help themselves."7 0 Home studio owner
Lamine Faye expresses his hope for the future of the project, saying
"[n]ow is the time to organize ourselves because I am sure it is
something that will last for the next generation and will truly help the
71
development of the country."
One of the most unique aspects of the Africa Music Project is
that it offers tangible support to the "indigenous creativity" argument
in favor of international IP laws. Up until this work, the argument
was theoretical.
Time will tell whether it in fact improves the
economies of Senegal and other African countries. If it does, it will be
a strong argument in support of the strict application of TRIPS and
other IP laws to developing countries.

67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 101. Piracy is the "unauthorized copying and selling of recordings." Id.
"Piracy level" is measured by the IFPI (a recording industry organization that conducts
many of the piracy level studies relied on by scholars) using various methods, including
how many music discs sold each year are pirated copies. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL
FEDERATION OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY (IFPI), THE RECORDING INDUSTRY 2005
COMMERCIAL PIRACY REPORT 3-5 (2005), available at http://www.ifpi.org/content
library/piracy2005.pdf [hereinafter IFPI] (discussing piracy levels in terms of how many
pirated discs were sold each year).
69.
Penna, supra note 11, at 104. The holograms are "difficult-to-counterfeit," and
a hologram placed on a "cassette or compact disc (CD) verifies that the distributor has paid
royalties." Id. This strategy has been combined with TV, radio, and flyer campaigns "to
inform the public of the importance-and legal obligation-of buying 'hologram' music." Id.
Ghana implemented the same hologram campaign, and piracy subsequently fell "from 80
percent to 20 percent." Id.
70.
Id. at 111.
71.
Id. at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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2. Intellectual Property Protection Does Not Address the Needs of
Developing Countries
On the other side of the debate, there are scholars who cry out
against the current level of intellectual property protection as "oldfashioned, Western-style imperialism" 7 2 and argue that international
IP laws do not take developing countries' cultural values into
account.73
This is often touted as the "developing countries'
arguments." In 1952, scholar Irwin Olian, Jr. expressed his concern
for developing countries:
Of the many problems facing developing countries, none is more urgent than the
need for wider dissemination of knowledge, for ultimately this will74act to further
the educational, cultural, and technical development of their people.

This problem persists today, and some developing countries claim that
effects of intellectual property protection, "such as higher prices and
limited access, can adversely affect the [developing countries'] ability
75
to educate its population and develop."
One suggested alternative to imposing the current system of
international IP law on developing countries is to allow a "threshold
level of economic development" before increasing intellectual property
protection. 76 The rationale is that piracy helps lay the foundation for
a developing country's infrastructure, and, once in place, the
"developed infrastructure enables the [developing country] to benefit
from increased protection."77 Using the Africa Music Project to
illustrate, this argument would allow piracy of both the music and the
technology behind the music until the infrastructure for the music
industry is in place, but would then require increasing intellectual
property protection. By that point, the developing society theoretically
should be able to bear the costs of intellectual property protection, and
78
the gains to society should outweigh these costs.
Another argument on this side of the debate focuses on the
intrinsic cultural differences between developing countries, including
traditional communities, and developed countries.
One author
explains this argument, called the "cultural narratives":
The cultural narratives seek to maintain and sustain the legitimacy of difference,
not overcome or manage those differences. The argument starts generally with the

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Hamilton, supra note 52, at 615.
Id. at 615-17.
Olian, supra note 26, at 88.
Brenner-Beck, supra note 5, at 101.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 102.
See id.
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proposition that developing countries have different value systems, engage in
creative endeavor for different reasons and are organized communally or through
kinship ties rather than as individuals. These differences in values, organization,
and heritage ... require different considerations
for intellectual property rights to
79
be meaningful in developing countries.

A number of developing countries retain traditional communities, so
this argument often turns towards the protection of indigenous
creativity or traditional knowledge. The World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) has drafted "Revised Provisions for the
Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions/Expressions
of
Folklore" and "Revised Provisions for the Protection of Traditional
80
Knowledge" in an attempt to address these issues.
Proponents of this position often suggest, among other
possibilities, sui generis intellectual property protection for traditional
communities and the incorporation of traditional laws into
international intellectual property protection. 8 ' Within music, there
are two examples used by scholars to bolster their arguments that
current laws do not address the needs of developing countries and
traditional communities. One is the OutKast performance at the 2004
Grammy Awards, which opened with the "sacred Navajo (Dine)
'Beauty Way' song . . . . 'meant to restore peace and harmony,"' and
then continued with backup dancers using a "traditional Plains-tribe
war cry" during the performance of the Outcast song "Hey Ya!".8 2 The
second example is the use of the traditional Ami "Song of Joy" in the
popular song "Return to Innocence" by Enigma.8 3 In neither example
did the pop group receive permission to use the traditional music from
the indigenous group.8 4 Some scholars think that incorporating group
rights and other ideals from traditional cultures would alleviate this

79.
Okediji, supra note 9, at 354.
80.
See World Intellectual Property Organization, Draft Provisions on Traditional
Cultural Expressions/Folklore and Traditional Knowledge
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/
consultations/draftprovisions/draftLprovisions.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
81.
See Gervais, supra note 5, at 138-39 (stating "if current intellectual property
norms are found to be inappropriate, we may need to consider new international norms,
including a sui generis right"); Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to
Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 178
(2000) (proposing incorporation of a "communal property rights" regime within the existing
intellectual property framework). Sui generis is defined as "constituting a class alone:
unique, peculiar." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/
sui%20generis (last visited Oct. 29, 2006).
82.
Riley, supra note 54, at 70-71.
83.
See Riley, supra note 81, at 175-76.
84.
See id. at 176-77 (Enigma); Riley, supra note 54, at 71-72 (OutKast).
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problem, allowing both the incorporation of traditional communities'
85
values and adequate protection for their cultural expressions.
II. ANALYSIS
A. One Size Does Not Fit All for IP Laws
One side of the current schism in the IP law debate argues that
Western-style protection of intellectual property rights stimulates
creativity and innovation by providing economic incentives to the
originator.8 6 The report by the Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights (hereinafter the Commission), which was presented to the
British government in 2002, summarizes the rationale underlying this
argument:
Some argue strongly that [intellectual property rights] are necessary to stimulate

economic growth which, in turn, contributes to poverty reduction. By stimulating
invention and new technologies, they will increase agricultural or industrial
production, promote domestic and foreign investment, facilitate technology
transfer and improve the availability of medicines necessary to combat disease.
They take the view that there is no reason why a system
that works for developed
87
countries could not do the same in developing countries.

This section critiques the argument above by first examining both the
costs and the benefits of stronger IP laws in developing countries, and
then discussing the implicit assumption of "institutional capacity"
contained in this argument.8 8
1. The Costs and Benefits of Stronger IP Laws
A significant number of studies and scholarship have aimed to
determine the costs of implementing stronger IP laws. The short term
costs for developing countries to implement IP laws are substantial,
and many developing countries may not be able to overcome this
barrier.8 9 Many assume that "there is a latent supply of innovative
capacity in the private sector waiting to be unleashed by the grant of

85.
86.

Riley, supra note 81, at 178.
See Brenner-Beck, supra note 5, at 91-92.

87.

COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 1.

88.

See generally id. at 137-53 (discussing institutional capacity).

89.
See COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 20-21 (2002)

(U.K.), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/finaLreport/CIPRExec_
Sumfinal.pdf.
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protection" from a system of IP laws in a developing country. 90
Although this may be true for certain industries in a handful of
developing countries, developing countries vary widely in their current
domestic capacity, and some countries may have decades of education,
infrastructure building, and investment in front of them before
achieving a self-sustaining level of domestic innovation.9 1
The transaction costs of implementing a system of IP laws
include "[e]stablishing the infrastructure of an [intellectual property
rights] regime, and mechanisms for the enforcement of IP rights," as
well as the post-implementation costs such as "the costs of
scrutinizing the validity of claims to patent rights ... and adjudication
upon actions for infringement." 92 The costs imposed on a developing
country by requiring protection of copyright and creative works are
slightly different than those for patents. 93 After strengthening IP
laws, the cost of textbooks and other educational materials may inflate
dramatically. 94 With respect to technology, most developing countries
import goods such as movies, music, and educational material,
resulting in very high access costs. 95 These costs could put the goods
out of reach to many consumers and exhaust the budgets of schools
96
and universities.
A quantitative illustration of implementation costs for a
developing country is available through the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
In 1996,
UNCTAD released a report estimating the cost of compliance with the
TRIPS agreement in developing countries. 97 The study estimated the
costs of compliance in Egypt to be $800,000 initially with annual
recurrent costs of around $1 million. 9
Bangladesh had initial
estimated costs of $250,000, with annual recurrent costs of $1.1
million. 99 In Global Economic Prospects and Developing Countries
2002, the World Bank estimated costs of $1.5 to $2 million to upgrade
the IP laws of a developing country. 10 0
To recoup these costs,
90.

COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 15.

91.

See id.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 145.
Id. (citing UNCTAD,

THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

(1996)).

99.

Id.

100.
Id. (citing WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, ch. 5 (2002)).
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developing countries may charge fees for certain services. 10 1 Chile, for
example, generated $6 million in fees in 1995 with an annual
expenditure of $1 million. 10 2 However, it is likely that most countries
will generate only a fraction of that in revenue each year.103
The benefits of stronger IP laws for developing countries are
often listed as: 1) increased technology transfer from developed
countries to developing countries; 2) an increase in the amount of FDI
in the developing countries; 3) research and development focusing
specifically on developing countries' needs; and 4) greater incentives
for domestic innovation and creativity. 10 4 There have been various
economic studies attempting to determine the link between IP laws
and the benefits listed above, some of which are summarized in a
10 5
research paper published in 2005 by the World Bank.
Examining the first two benefits, technology transfer and
increased FDI from developed to developing countries, there appears
to be "a positive role for [intellectual property rights] in stimulating
formal technology transfer, through FDI in production and [research
and development] facilities ..
,"106 However, the studies have also
found that a country's IP laws are only one factor among many
influencing FDI. 10 7 In fact, evidence suggests that "countries that
strengthen their [intellectual property rights] regimes are unlikely to
experience a sudden boost in inflows of FDI."'0 8 In a study by Keith E.
Maskus, strong IP laws alone were "insufficient for generating strong
incentives for firms to invest in a country."'1 9 Maskus explained that if
strong IP laws in turn generated strong incentives, FDI "would have

101.
"In most developing countries, [intellectual property rights] administration
agencies charge various fees for services related to processing applications for IP rights and
also for renewing those rights once awarded." Id.

102.
103.

Id.
Id.

104.
Brenner-Beck, supra note 5, at 91.
105.
See Fink & Maskus, supra note 53 (compiling approximately twelve articles
studying the effects of stronger IP rights on various economic indicators in developing
countries, including trade flows and foreign direct investment); id. at 2 (explaining that the
book is a compilation of studies "conducted by economic researchers at or affiliated with the
World Bank," and noting that empirical studies are particularly important in this context
because "many effects of stronger [intellectual property rights] standards are theoretically
ambiguous").
106.
Id. at 8.
107.
Id. at 7.
108.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
109.
Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging
Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPMENT, LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH, supra note 12, at 41, 54.
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gone largely to Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe." 110 In
reality, there has been a "sizable disinvestment" in Africa since the
early 1990s.111 Other factors, such as the long-term stability of a
country, trade competition rules, and taxes, also play a large role in a
firm's decision to invest in a developing country because these factors
can "affect[ ] the firm's perception that it will be able to earn higher

return on its protected knowledge-based assets through FDI.

. . ."112

Not all scholars agree that increased research and development
in developed countries focusing on developing countries' needs is
actually beneficial for the developing country. Carsten Fink and
Carlos A. Primo Braga describe the ideal situation between a source
country (exporting goods) and a destination country (importing goods)
as follows:
[T]he introduction of [intellectual property rights] stimulates innovation in the
source country and thus increases future trade flows. That effect is beneficial for
both trading economies, assuming that social returns on the innovations exceed
private returns. The international recognition of [intellectual property rights] also
can be seen as an adjustment mechanism that guarantees dynamic competition
between countries. Through [intellectual property rights], innovation-producing
countries have an incentive to develop new technologies,
which in their next
1 3
generation are manufactured by follower countries. 1

However, the study authors admit that "[m]ost studies conclude that
the destination country loses from tighter protection, whereas the
source country is usually better off."1 1 4 As explained earlier, most
developing countries are net importers of everything from technology
to entertainment.i 5 Although a developing country may benefit
because its needs are addressed by the research and development,
stronger IP laws can cause other problems, such as monopolies and
shifts of production from the developing country, where pirated goods
were manufactured before the new laws, to a developed country. 116
The fourth possible benefit to developing countries, an increase
in domestic innovation and creativity, is currently being studied by
the Africa Music Project. As previously discussed, the aim of the

110.

Id.

111.

Id. at 48. Africa's share in investment decreased from 2.6 percent to 0.9 percent

in the 1990s. Id.
112.
Id. at 54.
113.
Carsten Fink & Carlos A. Primo Braga, How Stronger Protectionof Intellectual
Property Rights Affects International Trade Flows, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPMENT, LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH, supra note 12, at 19, 22
(footnote omitted).

114.

Id.

115.
116.

See COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 17.
See id. at 21-22.
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Africa Music Project is "to help Africans to advance the business and
cultural potential of their music." 117 This is a program designed to go
hand-in-hand with stronger IP laws. 118 In effect, domestic industry
would strengthen and supplant the piracy industry as stronger IP
laws decrease piracy.1 19 One method for combating piracy is to place
holograms on copyrighted music. 1 20 Because the project is a recent
endeavor by the World Bank, a progress report is not yet available.
However, unconfirmed reports have indicated a substantial increase
in royalties for Senegalese musicians, and there are also reports that
piracy may have decreased dramatically since then. 121 However, The
Recording Industry 2005 Commercial Piracy Report claims Senegal is
still an area with a large number of piracy production facilities, and no
122
changes in piracy levels were reported.
This benefit has also been studied by Maskus, who published
an in-depth analysis of the effects of stronger IP laws on the Lebanese
entertainment and media industries. 123 Similar to the Senegalese
music industry, the entertainment industries in Lebanon benefit from

117.
Penna, supra note 11, at 95.
118.
See Finger, supra note 38, at 3-4. Finger expresses that the TRIPS agreement
basically requires implementation of the level of intellectual property protection "in place
in the most advanced countries." Id. at 3. Additionally, "to pass and enforce the laws that
create the . . .obligation [to protect developed countries' intellectual property] is a bound
obligation .. " Id. at 4. The Africa Music Project operates with this understanding.
119.
See, e.g., Penna, supra note 11, at 98-99 (noting that "[p]irates have more
means at their disposal than those responsible for policing them," there is currently little
infrastructure in Senegal's music field, and "[b]ecause of piracy, musicians are forced to
depend on revenue from outside the country"); id. at 99 (noting possible solutions to the
problems faced by the Senegalese musicians, including "[t]raining of backup staff' and that
"[t]he legal environment should not be imposed from the outside"); id. at 104 (noting that
holograms, one of the methods implemented in the Africa Music Project, reduced piracy in
Ghana from 80 percent to 20 percent). Gerard Seligman has noted that "[t]he great
limiting factor on the sales of music within Africa is piracy," due to piracy levels of at least
50% some countries. Gerard Seligman, The Market for African Music, in WORKSHOP ON
THE

DEVELOPMENT

OF

THE

MUSIC

INDUSTRY

IN

AFRICA

(2001),

available at

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCEERDResources/CWI-music-industry-inAfrica_
synopsis.pdf. Seligman stated that "a good, strong system of collection societies which
ensure that royalties are collected and paid" could provide the much-needed income to
artists and composers. Id.
120.
Penna, supra note 11, at 104.
121.
See UNCTAD, The Music Industry in Senegal: The Potential for Economic
Development (Draft), at 28 (Mar. 11, 2004) (prepared by Andy C. Pratt), available at
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/geographyAndEnvironment/whosWho/profiles/pratt/pdf/
Senegal.pdf [hereinafter The Music Industry in Senegal]. The total receipts reportedly
increased from 289,108,170 CFA in 2001 to 342,320,889 CFA in 2002. Id. However, due to
"hazy" recordkeeping by the BSDA, or the Copyright Office in Senegal, it is difficult to
confirm this data. Id.
122.
IFPI, supra note 68, at 18.
123.
See Maskus, supra note 12, at 259.
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a "large pool of creative talent" in Lebanon and enjoy success,
especially in the Middle East. 124 The Lebanese film industry enjoys
copyright protection, although the enforcement of copyright protection
is limited, and still suffers from piracy. 125 In the wake of stronger IP
laws, the industry claims it would increase production of films. 12 6
Maskus characterizes potential losses from stronger IP laws in
Lebanon as job loss for those employed at counterfeiting firms, rising
costs due to decreased domestic competition, and increased costs for
products that are not part of a strong domestic industry. 127 Potential
gains includes higher quality products, the possibility of counterfeiting
firms becoming legitimate producers of foreign products (due to
licensing of foreign products to domestic firms), and increased
revenues for the domestic film, television, and broadcasting industry
as a result of increased demand for Lebanese-produced film and
television. 128
Maskus suggests that with stronger IP laws, the
greatest benefit in Lebanon would be domestic innovation and
production. 129
There could be greater product development by
domestic companies as a result of stronger IP laws. 130 Although the
products developed probably would not be globally competitive, they
may be able to serve Lebanon and other local markets. 13 1 Film
production is one of the industries that could gain a foothold on the
1 32
regional market with stronger IP laws.
The World Bank studies found an increase in total trade as
another possible benefit of stronger IP laws in developing countries. 33
However, the authors found that, contrary to expectations, "the
stringency of a country's patent regime" was not tied to trade in "hightechnology products."'134 This is surprising because many assume that
trade of knowledge-intensive products (such as high-technology
products) increases dramatically with stronger IP laws. 135 The

124.
Id. at 263 ("Despite limited copyright enforcement, Lebanon has established a
clear competitive advantage within the Middle East as a producer and distributor of
literary and creative works .... Unauthorized copying of videotapes and music recordings
is common ...").
125.
See id.
126.
Id.
127.
Id. at 266-67.
128.
Id. at 266-67, 286.
129.
Id. at 289.
130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
Fink & Maskus, supra note 53, at 7.
134.
Id.
135.
Fink & Primo Braga, supra note 113, at 28.
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authors attributed this ambiguity to various factors including: 1)
transnational firms' realization that the local threats of reverse
engineering may not be particularly strong in some developing
countries; 2) the relatively large importance of IP laws in large
developing countries compared to small developing countries; 3) the
uniqueness of these findings to high-technology products; and 4) the
of
tendency of some firms to increase FDI and licensing instead
13 6
laws.
IP
stronger
are
there
when
countries
exports to developing
Overall, studies have found that many of the purported
benefits of strengthening IP laws in developing countries are
ambiguous. The benefits are highly dependent on the preexisting
conditions of the country, such as the presence of strong domestic
industry, and the laws may only benefit certain industries while
negatively affecting others. However, there are other benefits that
cannot be calculated through costs or studies. For instance, the
development of a particular industry, such as the music industry,
combined with the strengthening of IP laws may add a sense of
cultural solidarity to a developing country. 137 At the World Bank's
Workshop on the Development of the Music Industry in Africa, Nobel
Laureate Amartya Sen described the effects of strengthening the
music industry in Africa. 138 Although the contribution of creative arts
"to the richness of human lives" is not reflected in the gross national
product, the creative arts are an "inexpensive but effective" source of
joy in developing countries. 39 Sen expressed that the importance of
this source of joy by saying, "[m]usic and the creative arts will never,
but nor would food and
of course, replace the need for food and water,
40
medicine replace the need for creative arts."'
The growth of an industry may benefit many non-economic
The burgeoning music
characteristics of a developing country.
industry in Senegal and elsewhere in Africa has created hope that it
can contribute to "economic development, social change, 4 1political
cohesion, and cultural progress in that struggling continent."'

136.
137.

Fink & Maskus, supra note 53, at 7.
Amartya Sen, What's the Use of Music? The Role of the Music Industry in Africa,

in WORKSHOP ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY IN AFRICA (2001), supra note

119. Mr. Sen is the 1998 Nobel Laureate for Economic Sciences. See Nobelprize.org,
Economics 1998, http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/laureates/1998/ (last visited
Oct. 29, 2006).
See Sen, supra note 137.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
Id.
141.
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2. The Prerequisite Institutional Capacity for Strengthening IP Laws
Another critique of this argument is that there is a high
prerequisite institutional capacity to support the implementation of
increased IP laws. The World Bank Report Intellectual Property and
Development addresses this issue in passing, stating that a country
hoping to attract FDI "would be better advised to improve its overall
investment climate and business infrastructure" than strengthen its
IP laws. 14 2 The Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (the
Commission) delved more deeply into the problem and proposed that
developed and developing countries coordinate to "ensure that
national IP reform processes [coincide] with related areas of
development policy."'143 The Commission also urged donors and
developed countries to provide experts, offer legal advice, and
establish and expand the local institutional capacity in order to
identify these areas of policy.144
The Commission's proposition reflects the need for a prolonged
effort in assisting developing countries to form and implement IP
laws. An illustration of this for the Africa Music Project is explained
by Maskus at the Workshop on the Development of the Music Industry
in Africa.
The issue is as much one of institutional capabilities as of talent. The [private]
institutions include music publishers who put together studio performance
musicians and acquire song rights, record companies who make the master
recording, and then manufacture and distribute it locally and, possibly, globally.
. .. Coordinating such a complex set of players and incentives is beyond the reach
of unsupported private markets. . . . [O]ne cannot build a music business in a
vacuum. Establishing better economic environments, macro stability, creating
vibrant financial markets, better education, and so on are not just specific to
music, but they are ultimately the determining
factors in building almost any
145
industry in Sub-Saharan African countries.

Endeavors such as those in Senegal and Lebanon will not succeed
without the infrastructure to support them. A one-size-fits-all theory
of IP law is destined to fail because of the diverse array of domestic
capacity and economies that exist in developing countries.

142.

Fink & Maskus, supra note 53, at 7.

143.

COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 3,at 140.

144.
145.

Id.
Keith Maskus, The Economic Model, in WORKSHOP ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF

THE MUSIC INDUSTRY IN AFRICA, supra note 119.
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B. TRIPS Renders Obsolete Many PriorSuccess Stories Utilizing
Non-Western Style IP Laws
On the other side of the schism is the argument that Western
146
conceptions of IP law do not serve the needs of developing countries.
This includes the proposal either to allow traditional laws to control IP
in the country, 147 or to allow a period of weak IP protection in
developing countries. 148 Some suggested alternatives are "[having a]
system of group rights that places traditional knowledge in a
permanent condition of cultural protection," "[riesisting the expansion
of TRIPS-plus type legislation at the international level," and even
"[e]liminating copyright."' 49 As stated, an additional alternative is the
acceptance of piracy until a certain level of institutional capacity is
achieved. 150
Many scholars on this side quickly point out that current IP
5
laws benefit the owners of the rights, not necessarily the creators.' '
The TRIPS agreement manifests this modern trend by treating
152
intellectual property rights as economic and commercial rights.
Comparatively, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights from
1948 describes intellectual property rights as a human right, stating
"[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the moral and material

See Hamilton, supra note 52, at 615-17 (discussing the imposition through
146.
TRIPS of Western values such as individualism and reward upon developing countries with
non-Western value structures).
See Gervais, supra note 5, at 138-44.
147.
See Brenner-Beck, supra note 5, at 101.
148.
149.
The Copy/South Research Group, The Copy/South Dossier: Issues in the
Economics, Politics, and Ideology of Copyright in the Global South 159-60 (edited by Colin
Darch, et al.), available at https://www.kent.ac.uk/law/copysouthldossier.htm (May, 2006).
See id. for a list of alternatives.
Brenner-Beck, supra note 5, at 102.
150.
151.
See Copy/South Research Group, supra note 149, at 17-18 (arguing that the
concern over IP protection is to protect corporate profits, not creativity, because
corporations are generally the owners of the IP rights); id. at 23 (discussing how IP
protection primarily benefits the owners of IP rights, often large companies, while
"royalties and other earnings from intellectual property rights constitute only a fraction of
the income of most active professional artists," and expressing concern that the inequality
between the owners and the creators "has often resulted in creators being cheated by the
system while they were alive"); see also COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
supra note 3, at 6 (discussing the nature of current intellectual property rights and the
implications of treating IP rights as economic or commercial rights, which are often owned
by companies rather than inventors).
See TRIPS, supra note 7; see also COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
152.
RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 6.
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interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of
153
which he is the author."
It is significantly more difficult to analyze this side of the
argument, because many of the arguments are ideological and not
based on costs, benefits, or other economic indicators. There is little
hard evidence to support this argument because the global economy,
with international organizations such as the WTO, does not leave
much room for experimentation with IP law regimes. However, one
area where there has been a wider array of IP law approaches is the
IP laws regarding traditional
area of traditional knowledge.15 4
knowledge have not been harmonized on an international level. 155 By
examining different approaches to traditional knowledge, evidence
may come to light about the .advantages and disadvantages of
rejecting Western-style IP laws.
The Philippines is an example of a country with a legislative
approach to protecting traditional knowledge utilizing non-Western
styles of intellectual property protection. In 1997, the Philippines
enacted legislation giving indigenous communities rights over their
The
traditional knowledge, as well as certain land rights. 156
legislation incorporated customary laws of the indigenous
communities as well as equitable sharing of the benefits. 157 Although
the passage of the bill was a huge step for indigenous rights, the
implementation of the legislation has remained a problem. 158 For
example, the legislation conflicts with other laws, such as the

153.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), at 76, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 138th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10 1948), available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.
154.
WIPO defines traditional knowledge as "tradition-based literary, artistic or
scientific works; performances; inventions; scientific discoveries; designs; marks, names
and symbols; undisclosed information; and all other tradition-based innovations and
creations resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic
Terms,
Glossary
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Property
Organization,
Intellectual
World
fields."
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/glossary/index.html#tk (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
155.
See http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/ for evidence of the current debate in application
of IP laws to traditional knowledge.
Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997, Rep. Act No. 8371 (Oct. 29, 1997)
156.
(Phil.), availableat http://www.grain.orgfbrl?docid=8Oi&lawid=1508.
157.

COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 79.
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See Daniele Perrot-Maitre & Lynn Ellsworth, Case 4: The Philippines
Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, in DEEPER ROOTS (2003) available at
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http://www.fordfound.org/elibrary/documents/515/030.cfm
problems enforcing the legislation, including pressure from mining groups, lack of
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Philippine Mining Act of 1995, resulting in much confusion. 159 There
has also been difficulty combining the preexisting legal system with
the customary laws, primarily because "[t]he two bodies of law
originate from disparate contexts that involve different histories and
views on land issues and land rights." 160 This difficulty points to an
underlying issue with many of the suggested sui generis systems on
this side of the argument: there is already a legal system in place in
developing countries, and adding elements of another legal system
based on different norms may cause a much broader problem of
integration and instability.
Australia has taken a different approach to traditional
knowledge of the Aboriginal people and has not incorporated
customary law into copyright. 1 6 1 Milpurrurruv. Indofurn Pty Ltd. is a
case that illustrates how Australia deals with this issue. 62 In
Milpurrurru, rugs were imported from Vietnam that reproduced
Aboriginal artwork. 63
Finding that this constituted copyright
infringement under the Australian Copyright Act, the Federal Court
of Australia admitted that "[t]he statutory remedies do not recognise
the infringement of ownership rights of the kind which reside under
Aboriginal law."' 64
However, the Court considered the cultural
environment when determining damages, explaining:
In the present case the infringements have caused personal distress and,
potentially at least, have exposed the artists to embarrassment and contempt
within their communities if not to the risk of diminished earning potential and
physical harm. The losses arising from these risks are a reflection of 165
the cultural
environment in which the artists reside and conduct their daily affairs.

Although there is not legislative recognition of the Aboriginal laws
regarding copyright, this case provides some evidence of judicial
consideration of the customs.
These two examples illustrate another problem underlying the
traditional knowledge debate: in countries without the infrastructure
discussed in the previous section, implementation of any IP law

159.
Jose Mencio Molintas, The Philippine Indigenous Peoples' Struggle for Land
and Life: ChallengingLegal Texts, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 269, 291 (2004).
160.
Id. at 295.
161.
See AUSTRALIAN COPYRIGHT COUNCIL, INFORMATION SHEET G082: INDIGENOUS
ARTISTS 1 (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.copyright.org.au/specialinterest/
indigenous.htm (follow "Indigenous Artists"). "Copyright law applies to Indigenous artistic
works in the same way as it applies to other artistic works. There are no special provisions
for Indigenous works, and no recognition of customary or traditional Indigenous laws." Id.
162.
See Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty Ltd. (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240, 272 (Austl.).
163.
Id. at 240.
164.
Id. at 272.
165.
Id. at 277.
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system, Western or otherwise, will be difficult. This is the mutual
problem underlying both sides of the IP law debate. A certain level of
institutional capacity is necessary for success under either argument.
Also, rejecting Western-style IP laws outright does not
necessarily mean a desirable local system will step in. For instance,
many traditional systems of government are male-dominated, limit
participation of the general population, and have a limited scope and
capacity. 166 Whereas the customary laws or local system may have
methods for handling disputes or dealing with land rights, they may
not be as well-equipped to deal with issues such as intellectual
67
property protection for musicians and distribution rights.1
Furthermore, some scholars assume that traditional communities
have property rights that are very different than Western-style
ideals. 168 One example contrary to this assumption is the South
African San community, where 'only the author of the song was
' 69
entitled to sing it and only the poet was allowed to recite the poem." 1
With regard to the suggested alternatives of resisting TRIPSstyle approaches and allowing piracy, there are several real world
examples of success utilizing this formula. Both Taiwan and Korea
utilized "imitation and reverse engineering as an important element
in developing their indigenous technological innovative capacity" from
1960 to 1980.170 India granted weak IP protection to pharmaceuticals,
and the scope of Korea's patent laws initially excluded
pharmaceuticals, as well as foodstuffs and chemicals.1 71 All three
countries experienced economic growth during those periods and later
172
increased, to varying degrees, the strength of their IP laws.
The global economic climate has changed significantly,
however, since all of these case studies. With the implementation of
TRIPS, countries have considerably less flexibility, and therefore
arguments suggesting otherwise ignore the realities of today's global
economy. 173 TRIPS is nearly impossible for developing countries to

166.
Prometra, Africa and the Economy of Tradition: A Background Paper, at 16
(prepared by Graham Dutfield), available at http://www.prometra.org/Documents/
Note%20Graham%2ODutfield%2OEnglish.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
See id. at 16-17.
167.
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Id. at 17.
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avoid; at least 149 countries are members of the WTO. 174 Resisting
TRIPS, offered as an alternative by many scholars, is now more of a
concept than a practical solution.
C. The Solution: Tailored Systems and Tangible Benefits for
Developing Countries who Strengthen IP Laws
Instead of the extreme positions-one-size-fits-all and outright
rejection of Western-style IP law-there are many shades of gray
allowed under the current international agreements. 175 The proposed
solution to this current schism is threefold: 1) implementation, in
phases, of IP laws that are tailored to a country's needs; 2) greater
guidance and involvement by international organizations to help a
country build on its strengths and pre-existing industries; and 3) a
mandatory level of investment or involvement by developed countries
in the creation and development of these IP law regimes and
industries in the developing countries.
This solution combines many of the characteristics of the two
extremes, and it also implements a number of the issues highlighted
by the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights. Some of the
Commission's concerns include: the homogeneity of IP laws compared
to the heterogeneity of developing countries1 76; the high cost
associated with "getting an IP system 'wrong' in a developing
country" 77; the costs to developing countries of strengthening IP laws
compared with the benefits 78 ; and the need to increase the
institutional capacity of developing countries.179
As discussed, while there are many benefits attributed to
stronger IP laws, studies indicate that these benefits are at best
ambiguous. 80 Therefore, there must be a concerted effort to make the
costs of implementing IP laws in a country as small as possible, and
tailoring the IP laws to each country's needs is an important step in
achieving this. For instance, in the Africa Music Project, there was
significant investment in developing the music industry, but there was
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See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 20, art. 9(2) (allowing exemption of
artistic or literary works from copyright in certain situations).
176.
COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 4-5.
177.
Id. at 4.
178.
Id. at 5.
179.
Id. at 137.
180.
See generally Fink & Maskus, supra note 53.

198

VANDERBILTJ. OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 9:1:1

not a strong enough effort to streamline and update the Copyright
Office; as a result the advances have been difficult to track.18 1 In
Lebanon, where the entertainment industry is poised to emerge as a
dominant industry, a limited reorganization of the copyright office is
planned but has not yet been implemented.1 8 2 In countries with
stronger technological capacity, such as China or India, the needs are
different from a country in sub-Saharan Africa where there is little
domestic technological innovation.18 3 Costs associated with this
particular endeavor would probably include research on the domestic
industries, analysis by experts of how to best maximize the country's
potential, and the other costs of implementing IP laws. Although this
prong may include extra costs at the front end, it will help avoid
"getting [the] IP system 'wrong,"' which would result in even greater
18 4
costs long-term.
The second prong of this solution is intertwined with the first
prong. In order to tailor a system of IP laws to a country's needs,
experts and representatives with experience in IP laws must be
involved. These experts may come from the World Bank, the WTO,
WIPO, or any of the various developing countries that have been at
the forefront of the push for stronger IP laws. The World Bank is
involved with the Africa Music Project, and its involvement has been
instrumental in recognizing the potential of the Senegalese music
scene. It recognized the possibility of having one or two "Nashvilles"
in African countries and the long-term effects this would have on
diversifying their economic base. 8 5 Without such insight, a seemingly
non-essential industry such as music might not be promoted within a
country.
The third prong of the solution recognizes that developed
countries are often pushing for stronger IP laws, not to reduce poverty
in developing countries, but to protect their own interests in
capitalizing on their own innovations and creations. Therefore, a
mandatory requirement could be imposed, similar to a community
service requirement at some universities. For example, when the
Recording Industry Association of America discusses its war on piracy,
there is no explicit mention of helping artists in developing countries,
but there is much reference to the threat of international piracy to the
181.
Compare The Music Industry in Senegal, supra note 121, at 28, with IFPI,
supra note 122, at 18.
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American music industry's profits. 8 6 As the Commission's report
points out, "commercial companies are responsible to their
shareholders . . . [and] . . .are not charities."'18 7 Instead, companies
expect governments and international organizations to represent both
the rights and responsibilities of developed countries. 8 8 As explained
earlier, there has been little more than a tenuous link proven between
FDI and stronger IP laws in developing countries. 8 9 If this is going to
be used to entice developing countries into stronger IP laws, then
some sort of investment should occur.
A mandatory level of
involvement, requiring developed WTO members to work with
developing WTO members, would be a step towards counteracting the
flow of capital from developing countries to developed countries within
intellectual property.
Although this solution does not address all of the arguments of
each side of the schism, in the end it strengthens IP laws in
developing countries while ensuring developing countries get tangible
benefits instead of the elusive benefits that are commonly associated
with stronger IP laws.
. III. CONCLUSION
A three-pronged solution, combining characteristics of both
extreme positions in the international IP law debate, would help
developing countries such as Lebanon and Senegal survive the
difficult process of strengthening their IP laws. This solution accepts
that IP law must be strengthened in developing countries to meet
their obligations in the TRIPS agreement. However, it also respects
the vast knowledge gap, institutional capacity, and unique industries
and values in developing countries all over the world.
Tailoring a country's domestic IP laws before implementation
would take into account the specific needs of each country, by
considering which domestic industries could thrive and what products
would necessarily be imported. These unique IP regimes would
require the guidance of experts from international organizations and
developing countries. One important aspect to be considered by the
experts is a careful assessment of the cultural attitudes and values of
each country before formulation of a plan. These experts must be seen
186.
See http://www.riaa.org for a discussion of the costs of piracy and RIAA's
collaboration with the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) to
work against piracy in all areas of the world.
187.
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not as representatives of the former colonizers or Western ideology,
but as persons invested in the strengthening and stabilization of each
country.
Finally, requiring a mandatory level of investment by
developed countries in the developing countries would be the most
controversial aspect of the solution. However, it could also be seen as
a necessary compromise between developed and developing countries.
If developed countries push for stronger IP laws in developing
countries, and will benefit from the strengthened IP laws, then it is a
small concession to insist on educational assistance, expert guidance,
and perhaps even technology transfer.
In a globalized economy, people from all corners of the world
are finding increased commonalities. Music, "touch[ing] every person
of every culture on the globe," is one of those shared
understandings. 190 Today, artists such as Eminem or Madonna can be
heard almost anywhere in the world. If the Africa Music Project
succeeds, someday the Senegalese band Rafrache will also be
streaming from stereos in Nashville, London, and Hong Kong. By
incorporating and accepting the unique circumstances of IP in Senegal
and other developing countries, domestic industries and artists such
as Rafrache may flourish on the global stage.
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